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CLS

WASN'T KILLED BY A QUESTION

John Henry Schlegel*
More than a few years ago, my good friend Michael Fischl tried to answer "The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies."' He observed that
the question, "What would you put in its place?,"'2 always offered in response to Critical Legal Studies' critique of liberal legalism, reflected a
mostly conscious strategy to avoid that critique by treating it as normatively, not structurally, offered. He also noted that the critics regularly, but
incorrectly, assumed that our observation that liberalism regularly privileged individualist, not communitarian, alternatives meant that we were
always in favor of the communitarian, often read as covertly socialist or
totalitarian, alternative to existing legal norms.
Michael's was a wonderful article, clear, cleanly argued, and funny. The
problem that he was trying to address is intrinsic to any critique of an ideology. The hallmark of an ideology is its taken-for-grantedness. Ideologies
never have an authoritative statement because they are "so obvious" to participants in it that they need not be stated. So, the initial task of any critic is
to develop a clean statement of the ideology. Doing so always brings forth
two objections: first, "no one has said that," unfortunately both true and an
indication that the critic has isolated an ideology; and second, "What would
you put in its place?," an invitation to enter the ideology, precisely what the
critic does not want to do. 3 Michael wrote about the second of these objections, but CLS received a good deal of the first as well. Still, however accurate Michael's understanding of the failings of CLS's critics was, in retrospect it seems to me that his observations were beside the point. As an understanding avant la lettre of the slow fading away of the movement known
*
Professor of Law and Roger and Karen Jones Faculty Scholar, State University of New York at
Buffalo. This piece is for Wythe, whose steadfastness in the articulation of his understanding of the
world of law/society gave unintended, but welcomed, steadfastness to mine. Fred helped, as always, this
time by spotting a crucial omission, as did Laura, Lynn, Pierre, Bert, and participants in a faculty colloquium at Buffalo. As I wrote this piece, the first for the retirement of a contemporary, I was struck by
how much I miss the assistance of Alan and Al in my writing projects and, concomitantly, how much I
treasure the assistance of those other individuals, in both senses of that word, who for varying numbers
of years have come to fill the discussions that take place at what is now my mostly metaphoric kitchen
table.
I.
Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRy 779 (1992). Michael meant the title ironically, not presciently. Few people have taken it that
way.
2.
Id. at 780 (emphasis omitted).
3.
Bert and I together worked out this understanding of ideology critique one evening when both of
us were too tired to write.
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as CLS,4 the article ignored the peculiar rhythm of academic scholarship
that David Trubek once made clear to me.
One time in the late 1980s, David and I produced a piece about American Legal Realist, Dean of the Yale Law School and later Second Circuit
Judge, Charles E. Clark. 5 In one of our telephone conversations, I commented that I was worried that our hearty band of CLS legal scholars hadn't
had a new idea in several years. He responded, "Quiet Schlegel. Someone
might hear you." David's implicit understanding of the rhythm of academic
scholarship is crucial to developing a similar understanding of the fading
away of CLS. Unless one is a Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, or Einsteinand we were none of those--one needs to remember Andy Warhol' s fifteenminute rule, a rule that aptly describes his own career. To extend one's fame
beyond the allotted time, one needs to have a nicely spaced series of new
ideas. Without such, the academic butterflies will quickly shift their attention to the next pretty flower and the great Mississippi of scholarship will
"jes keep[] rollin' alon'."6
So, CLS wasn't killed by a question; it simply drifted out of fashion for
want of a "new look.",7 This is not for the lack of attempts to maintain our
place in the academic top ten. Indeed, Duncan Kennedy still tries 8 and so
does Pierre Schlag. 9 However, we haven't had a hit in twenty years, so I
4.
A confession needs be made at this point. In the mid-1980s, I faded away from CLS's organized
activities. At the time, I gave as my reason the assertion that the group had tumed its attention away
from an interest in theory and toward proselytizing. Possessing a visceral dislike of missionaries and an
expanded family, it appeared to me to be sensible to focus my energies elsewhere. I now understand that
what I took to be a cause of my fading away was an effect, probably wholesome, of the absence of
attention to theory that I felt. We had no new theory to discuss.
5.
See John Henry Schlegel & David M. Trubek, Charles E. Clark and the Reform of Legal Education, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 81 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991).
6.
01' Man River, in SHOW BOAT, in MILES KREUGER, SHOW BOAT: THE STORY OF A CLASSIC

AMERICAN MUSICAL 54 (1977). Of course some people would argue that there are no "next pretty flowers" in the garden of legal scholarship. I see no need to take a position on this question because clearly
some legal academics believe that there are such flowers.
7.
I have made two earlier, equally partial attempts to come to grips with the fading of Critical
Legal Studies as a hot topic in legal academia: John Henry Schlegel, But Pierre, If We Can't Think
Normatively, What Are We to Do?, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 955 (2003) and John Henry Schlegel, Of Duncan, Peter, and Thomas Kuhn, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 1061 (2001). Michael made the production of these
two pieces easy and unintentionally provided the hook for this one. I thank him for his efforts and warm
friendship. "No," you do not smell a book brewing.
A workshop presentation for colleagues at Buffalo reminded me of causes for the decline of the
CLS movement other than the ones I have written about previously and the one I identify as central to
my discussion here. There was a terrible problem with elitism among us and related problems of a certain social insularity, as well as of a fear that outsiders might undermine our project. We also suffered
from a certain disciplinary backlash that caused tenure problems for younger participants and fellow
travelers. Further, we lacked either an interest in dealing seriously with the problem of consciousness
that our work raised or an ability to do so. And when rejecting the Enlightenment legacy in modem
thought, we were unwilling to confront the possibility that we would also have to jettison the perfectibility of man and so reassert some version of the doctrine of original sin. Of course, none of these problems
detracts from the fact that some of the ideas from CLS survive as part of the armament available to the
legal scholar today, however diminished in potency these ideas may be. But the legacy of a movement is
a different matter from its survival. As a coherent intellectual force in American legal thought Critical
Legal Studies, like American Legal Realism, slowly disappeared like water into the sand.
8.
9.

See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIPCLE (1997).
See, e.g., PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998).
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suppose that we now play mostly on the "Golden Oldies" stations. The nice
thing about being a historian is that once the music hits those stations, one
can call the reexamination of no longer popular tunes "scholarship." So, I
wish to examine one of the ideas--critical historical doctrinal scholarshipthat didn't keep us going, though not for want of trying, by looking at the
very best defense of that idea: Robert W. Gordon's elegantly written, graciously argued, CriticalLegal Histories.10
Bob" spends the first forty-plus pages in the description and remorseless demolition of every variety of "evolutionary functionalism": "notions
about historical change and the relationship of law to such change" that
assert that "the natural and proper evolution of a society ... is towards the
type of liberal capitalism seen in the advanced Western nations ... and that
the natural and proper function of a legal system is to facilitate such an evolution." 12 Unpacked a bit, evolutionary functionalism asserts that there are
separate but linked entities identifiable as "law" and "society," that society
has objective "needs," and that legal systems adapt to those needs. Bob attacks this notion not frontally but through a recapitulation of other's objections to the theory and their attempts to reconstruct it. Thus, he comments
on the choice to treat objective needs as group interests, to loosen the relationship between legal responses and social needs, and to historicize and
contextualize both social needs and legal consciousness. He concludes that
"both needs and responses, and indeed the idea of needs-and-responses itself, must
be seen as the cultural products of contingent modes of
'3
thought."'
It is important to recognize that, by this point, Bob has done not just
what Marx is supposed to have done to Hegel. He has not only turned evolutionary functionalism on its head but also has done a half twist, so it is
now an apparently independent, contingent, human consciousness that establishes both social needs and legal responses. But this understanding still
is not critical enough for Bob's objectives. He adds another full twist by
rejecting the distinction between law and society, by emphasizing the "fundamentally constitutive character of legal relations in social life,' 4 by finding law to be "[c]onstitutive of [c]onsciousness,"' 5 and by stirring in both
the fundamental contradiction and its intellectual dependent, the indeterminacy critique, so as to be able to conclude that, "if... law is founded upon
contradictions, it cannot also be ... that any particular legal form is required
by, or a condition of, any particular set of social practices."' 6 Thereafter,
Bob defends CLS's "distinctive and exciting brand of doctrinal historiogra10.
11.
his own
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
At times like this I wish I were Bob Gordon. He could do so much better a job of summarizing
or someone else's thought than I ever will be able to do.
Gordon, supra note 10, at 59.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 116.
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phy"-"thickly described accounts of how law has been imbricated
in and
17
has helped to structure the most routine practices of social life."'
CriticalLegal Histories was a really bravura dive off the intellectual ten
meter platform. Yet there were two peculiar things about the article. 8 The
most obvious peculiarity was Bob's choice to retain to the end the assumption that a truly functionalist account must assert a positivist's necessary
relationship between need and response.' 9 This choice was troubling for two
reasons. First, it was logically dubious since a response may be functional
but not necessarily, and even unintentionally, so. The great weakness of
evolutionary functionalism was not the assertion that social practices including law have functions, but that these practices have a necessary relationship to the problem or situation that they are supposedly responding to.
A classic example that both recognizes the contingency of "needs" and
"responses" and the possibility that a response can be functional is to be
found in the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 that new issues of
securities be registered and that their sale be accompanied by a prospectus.2 °
It is not clear exactly what the need for this legislation was. Among the candidates can be included increasing the willingness of investment banks to
underwrite securities issues and increasing the willingness of investors to
purchase the securities being issued. Though, in truth, it was mostly an angry response to earlier bad practices in the industry. It is exceedingly doubtful whether the Act was functional with respect to either "need." Section 11
of the Act imposed a liability on underwriters 2' that, if anything, would have
deterred the investment banks from offering securities. Prospectuses are by
and large not read, so the existence of such documents is not likely to have
increased the willingness of investors to open their wallets.
A much more effective piece of legislation would have backed securities issues with a federal guarantee. Nevertheless, over time the legislation
has been modestly effective, i.e., functional, in moving the weakest, most
dubious, or even outrightly fraudulent issues away from the national securities market and consolidating them in more local, backwater markets. This
regional shift probably had the effect of, i.e., was functional for, increasing
the reputation of the large eastern firms and so marginalizing the more local
firms, which probably resulted in increasing the national penetration of
these eastern firms and so of the reach, and concomitantly the depth, of the
market for large, new issues. Could one have accomplished this end otherwise? Surely, a requirement that all persons offering securities possess a
17.
Id. at 125.
18.
It is important that at this point I note that Bob asked for my comments on his piece when it was
in draft and thanked me for my efforts in the * note to the published version. Much of what follows
tracks my comments to him then, though cleaned up for public presentation. Our differences about these
matters are old and treasured. Still, "[sipeech after long silence; it is right." W.B. Yeats, After Long
Silence, reprintedin 1 THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 304, 304 (1938).
19.
I use "choice" advisedly. Bob recognized that some CLS scholars did not look at functionalism
in this way. See Gordon, supra note 10, at 61 n.l 1.
20.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
21.
See id. §77k.
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high minimal amount of capital would likely have brought the same result.
But what was done was functional toward this end, just as a heavy crescent
wrench, while not designed for the purpose of hammering a nail, will do
that task reasonably well-at least if the nail is small enough.
Second, Bob's choice to retain to the end the assumption that a functionalist account of law must assert a positivist's necessary relationship between need and response was troubling because it relegated those CLS
scholars who saw a world filled with contingent functional responses to the
land of not sufficiently thorough, i.e., partial, instrumentalist critiques, to a
building away from the main house as it were. This choice engendered a
certain amount of hard feelings among scholars who saw things this waynot a good result in a group that, although portrayed in the law school
world, and eventually the national press, as an advancing horde, was in fact
quite small. Moreover, a defense of the constitutive role of legal norms in
social life, and so of the kind of doctrinal scholarship that Bob wished to
trumpet, did not require any particular resolution of the question of law's
functionality. Logically, law might have been constitutive and necessarily
functional, constitutive and not necessarily functional, or constitutive and
not functional at all. The claim for constitutiveness did not rise or fall based
on the position taken with respect to the functionality of law's response to
social life. Perhaps the argument for constitutiveness was cleaner, and so
easier to make, from the assumption that functionality assumed necessity.
But, beyond such considerations, it is hard to see why those CLS adherents
who didn't see things that way needed to be relegated to the out buildings.2 2
The other peculiar aspect of CriticalLegal Histories is both less clear
on the text and less socially problematic than Bob's choice to retain to the
end the assumption that a functionalist account of law must assert a positivist's necessary relationship between need and response. It can be illuminated with the aid of a little story. In the same issue of the Stanford Law
Review that Bob's piece appeared, I innocently, but apparently infamously,
stated, "LAW IS POLITICS., 23 About ten years later, Pierre Schlag asked
me whether everyone knew that this assertion, common among CLS types,
implied that POLITICS IS LAW. I responded to the effect that, as a onetime
student of mathematics, I knew of the "symmetric property of equality," but
I had no idea what anyone else knew. Now, I do not wish to suggest that
Bob did not know his math, but it seems to me that if law is constitutive of
consciousness and law and society cannot be distinguished, then society is
equally constitutive of consciousness. Similarly, if law is imbricated in society, then society is imbricated in law. Given this symmetric relationship,
Bob ought to have concluded that thickly described doctrine was only half
of the story. At the least, thick description needed to be done on both sides
22.
Bob denies that this relegation was his intent. I am sure he is correct. However, mine is not a
question of intent but of effect. Some of us felt that we had been sent to the out buildings. I was but one.
23.
John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the
Conference on CriticalLegal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 411 (1984).
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of the intentionally collapsed divide between law and society. However,
Bob chose not to see it so.
I suppose that to ask why Bob made the choice to focus only on necessary functionality and to treat the constitutive nature of law as not requiring
parallel thick descriptions of legal consciousness and social practice is in
some sense to undermine the critical historical project as he saw it. Still,
similar considerations have never stopped me before, so I see no reason to
let them stop me now. Bob adverts to several reasons for his choice in his
text. Doctrine is easy for law professors to research because it is at hand and
the resulting scholarship will easily find a place in class discussion. Moreover, as the socio-legal studies types have had little impact on the law
schools and critical study of doctrine has "stirred up a fabulous ruckus," 24
continuing the enterprise 25 is a good thing. He might also have noted that
the ad-hocing of functionality is one of those things that law professors do
easily, but badly, even uncritically, and thus should never be approved of.
Lurking below these considerations is Bob's dissatisfaction with the
"apologetic aspects" of socio-legal studies in the Realist vein. 6 And then
there surely was an unwillingness to criticize in print the work of the large
portion of the historians who identified themselves with CLS, the obverse
consideration of the one I explored earlier with my metaphor of relegation
to an out building.27
A more hidden aspect of Bob's choice, I suspect, is this. In the late
1970s and early 1980s, there was still a real fear of orthodox, determinist
Marxism abroad in the land and, as Fischl adverted to in his article, "red
baiting" was not an uncommon practice, even in academia.28 Regularly,
academics on the left attempted to distance themselves from such fear and
accompanying hostility. Indeed, the critical part of CLS comes from the
already distanced Critical Marxism of the Frankfurt School that, with an
admixture of Derrida, Foucault, and various structuralisms, was beginning
to turn into Critical Theory, a language that Marx would have abhorred.
Even in the most liberal parts of the academic legal world, Marx meant
Lenin; Lenin meant Stalin; Stalin meant the purges and gulags; and Stalin's
successors meant a possibly technologically advanced economy as part of a
society even more repressive than our own. In such circumstances, one can
understand an aversion to a deterministic vision of social relations coming
24.
Gordon, supra note 10, at 122.
25.
Though why focused on the "core doctrinal subjects of the first year curriculum" escapes me.
See id.
26.
Id. at 70.
27.
There were also conflicting impulses on the society/social practice side as well as the law/legal
consciousness side that would have been a bear to negotiate. While one can simplify the potential disputes to materialism v. idealism, this dichotomy is only roughly useful. Participants in CLS supported
differing varieties of structural explanation on both sides of the dichotomy, as well as differing varieties
of material/cultural explanations. There was the burgeoning fight between modernists and postmodernists. And there were the emerging feminist and critical race essentialisms in the offing. It was not
stupid to avoid these disputes.
28.
Fischl, supra note 1,at 799 n.47, 800.
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from the left, given that, on top of everything else, the traditional Marxist
determinism already seemed not to have panned out.
As Bob wound his argument down, he offered both an evaluation of the
work of the CLS historians whose work he wished to laud and a prediction
of the results of their work. Respectively they went: "I love the work that
the Critical doctrinal historians have been doing. I think it's among the most
exciting intellectual work being done anywhere and that it has revolutionized our vision of our legal past., 29 And, "I predict that the forces of the
orthodox will simply abandon their traditional doctrinal ground to the Critics, claiming that 'it doesn't matter
anyway, because it doesn't have any30
thing to do with the real world."'
Bob's evaluation has proven to be remarkably correct. The historical
work of this part of the CLS crowd, indeed of the entire CLS crowd, has,
over time, turned out to have the most lasting influence of any of our work,
especially among historians. Citations abound and the corpus continues to
grow. However, his prediction was as wrong as can be-not that any of
mine ever turn out to be right either. Doctrine remains central for
scholar/teachers in the legal academy. Yet, most of these individuals ignore
CLS historical writing while they work within some version of evolutionary
functionalism in their classrooms and scholarship. Just why is it that the
CLS historical scholarship that has been so successful among historians has
not been equally successful among law professors? Answering this question
may help to explain why CriticalLegal Histories was not the next big idea
that CLS needed in order to avoid being taken to have died for want of an
answer to a simple question.
What made Bob's idea not the intellectual equivalent of either of the
two notable CLS ideas-the indeterminacy critique and the critique of
rights? One weakness is simple to understand in retrospect, though we in
CLS did not see it at the time. To focus historical scholarship on doctrine
was to invite the question-"What would you put in its place?"-that Fischl
explicated in his article. Whatever we meant to be doing as we explicated
doctrine, then as now, in the legal academy doctrinal analysis is understood
as normative statement. Descriptive doctrinal work is treatise writing. That
our scholarship asserted its descriptive nature was to many people an implausible proposition since, whatever we were doing, it was not treatise
writing. Thus, it was easy for liberal or conservative law professors to see
our self-described critique as covertly normative but lacking in the prescriptive dimension that always accompanies liberal legalist 31 scholarship. After
29.
Gordon, supra note 10, at 122. This is only the first time Bob has uttered such an observation.
More recently he called a later, slightly different movement in legal history, perhaps "the most exciting
work currently being done on law." See Robert W. Gordon, Foreward: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (1997). Bob's public generosity towards new work is to be treasured.
30.
Gordon, supra note 10, at 122.
31.
Laura regularly chides me for this locution, as well as its companion, "liberal legalism." The
implicit reference in both phrases is to JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL
TRIALS (1964). That reference still seems apt. "Legal liberalism," Laura's locution for what Pierre
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all, criticism of existing doctrinal norms is the first move in most any piece
of such scholarship. So, the doctrinal focus that was supposed to make our
work accessible played into our opponent's frustration that we were criticizing their edifice-after all, we called our work an internal critique-but not
playing by their rules. Like a prizefighter who jabs quickly and then dances
away, we brought forth an endless stream of complaints that we were unwilling to "stand there and fight like a man."
The other weakness seems to me to be more complex. Start with the
proposition just now offered-the form of CLS doctrinal history made it
easy for its detractors to mistake our work for a coy version of the normative legal scholarship that endlessly fills the law reviews. The obverse side
of this coin can then be reasonably inferred. This scholarship looked like
standard legal scholarship. It was not by its form distinctive. Unfortunately,
in any academic dust-up, distinctiveness matters.
The other two big ideas of CLS were quite distinctive. The indeterminacy critique, while hardly original, had not been put as bluntly as we put it
for years. It asserted that the common judicial and law review activity, reasoning by analogy-more grandiosely known as "thinking like a lawyercould never meet the criteria for legality established by the liberal legalist
notion of the rule of law. Rules could not constrain legal action in and of
themselves. Pound's taught tradition, the limitations of vision that accompany capitalism, party/partisan political imagination, all of the above, or
something else constrained choice-this was a multiple choice test-lent a
"tilt," in Wythe Holt's felicitous phrase, 32 to the outcome of legal argument.
To suggest that the rule of law needed shoring up was a big deal.
The critique of rights, while a less fundamental an attack on liberal legalism, was still quite striking a claim. The idea that rights were an example
of the theory of the second best undermined almost all of contemporary
constitutional law and might have been extended to a large portion of civil
law following on Stewart Macaulay's famous piece, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary Study.33 Constitutional law is most often
told as the story of the struggle for rights. Rights is the language of public
discourse-abortion rights, children's rights, civil rights, contract rights,
gay rights, intellectual property rights, plain old property rights, taxpayer's
Schlag called "normative legal thought," see, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 811 (1991), has always seemed to be too tied to solving problems through legal

process and so is a species of legalism, as Shklar understood it. Processual norms are fine if that is the
best that one can do, but having the community support and understanding that make legal norms unnecessary, because taken for granted, is still better. And so Grant Gilmore's famous observation, "In Hell
there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed," still seems a good answer
to the faith in law and legal process that is at the heart of legal liberalism. See GRANT GILMoRE, THE
AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977). And then there is the fact that, for us, "liberal" and "liberalism"
was not a political stance to be distinguished from "conservative" and "conservatism" but a political

philosophy to be distinguished from the various species of both autarchy and communitarianism. For us,
her locution simply could not work.
32.
Wythe Holt, Tilt, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 280 (1984).
Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. SOC.
33.

REV. 55 (1963).
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rights, women's rights, worker's rights-all resound with the feel of law's
achievements. We even know numbered rights-First Amendment rights,
Second Amendment rights, etc. To suggest that community solidarity
trumped some people's rights and so made other's rights unnecessary was to
undermine the normative discourse of law quite directly.
In contrast, to suggest that doctrinal history and analysis would allow
one to understand the way that law privileged one or another outcome was
not a very big claim. To make an equally big claim for historical scholarship, one would have had to argue that the constitutive nature of the relationship between law and society meant that to understand law, even to do
normative legal scholarship, one would have to thickly and extensively describe both doctrine and social practice. That claim would have gained CLS
a certain amount of attention, as it would have undermined the doctrinally
normative simplicity, as well as the empirically hypothetical thinness, of all
legal scholarship, including this piece.
Thus, fusing internal and external critique would have been a tour de
force, except no one in CLS had ever carried it off-to Bob's satisfaction at
least. Not being a fool, Bob knew that to have advocated a standard for
scholarship without an example of such work that he was willing to stand by
would have been seen as the equivalent of suggesting the design for a bridge
to be built somewhere, some time, but not by me or my friends, hardly an
action to be taken seriously. Even, had Bob been willing to accept the risk
of seeming foolish, the choice to follow out mutual constitutiveness in this
way surely ran the risk that it would tend to emphasize the distinction between normative legal scholarship and law and society scholarship that we
in CLS were trying to obliterate. Such reinforcement might not have helped
the CLS cause.
The difficulty of taking such a risk was compounded by the knowledge
that establishing academic distinctiveness depends on a firm delineation of
what one is not. In our case, what we in CLS were not were scholars participating in the Law and Society movement whose work at that time was
defined by the endless repetition of research designed to show the gap between law on the books and the law in action. 34 To have invited social empiricism into the fold, even social empiricism divorced from the obsession
that is "gap" studies, would have risked loss of brand identity-never a
good thing for a young academic movement. And so Bob chose to privilege
one type of scholarship over another, rather to attempt to fuse them bothor so it seems to me.
All this said, I've never been convinced that CLS didn't have adequate
examples of historical work that thickly described both sides of the inten34.
It is modestly ironic that it was at just this moment that Law and Society studies began its shift
from "gap" studies to the more interpretive, consciousness-centered work that dominates that field today.
See, e.g., David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an
American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'y REv. 551 (1984); Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transformationof Disputes, 15 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 775 (1981).
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tionally collapsed divide between law and society. My buddy Fred Konefsky's work on Daniel Webster 35 and a later piece on early nineteenth century elites 36 surely tried to make this idea work. Others did too. But the person who tried hardest was Wythe. True, his unrepentant, even proud Marxism did not make his efforts attractive to many in the academic world.
However, his two pieces on nineteenth century labor law, the first on the
early labor conspiracy cases 37 and the second on the problem of the recovery by the employee who quits before the end of his or her "contractual"
term of employment, 38 seem to me to do an excellent job of both showing
the loose structural potential of the relevant doctrine and the deep contours
of the social world of the judges, as well as of the workers and employers.
True, Wythe always saw the endless interplay of doctrine and context that
he called dialectical as leading more likely than not toward one doctrinal
and social result. But that is quite a different thing than a position that everywhere sees the inevitability of the immiseration of the working class. And
anyone who has talked with him over the years knows that Wythe is as inventive as anyone of us when it comes to identifying doctrinal possibilities
more consistent with his work on behalf of
leading to alternative outcomes
39
the "party of humanity.,
Was Bob's choice a mistake? At the least, Bob should not be faulted for
not focusing on Wythe's labor law work because it was published after
CriticalLegal Histories was written. But what might be the case if one puts
aside the question of available models of CLS work? I would be hard
pressed to call Bob's choice a mistake. Even in a world of significant social
and intellectual contingency, it is impossible to say that the safe bet is a
mistake. Among other things, the pitch of the playing field was always
against us. To have had a ten-year run against that pitch is an amazing
achievement. Perhaps no new idea could have continued that run or could
have kept us such a distasteful morsel that the "wad"-the great Borg-like
apparatus of liberal legalism-could not have assimilated CLS as just another tempting perspective on law.4°

35.
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A phrase for which Wythe always cites Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV.
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And this is exactly what happened to CLS. Liberal legalism mutated slightly, shifting to a softer
form of policy analysis based upon a weakened understanding of the constraint that the rule of law
places on legal action, a shift that has angered conservative academics but not brought them to open
revolt. Adopting a weaker version of the rule of law constraint blunts the force of the indeterminacy
critique. Pierre suggested this observation to me.
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Still, I believe Bob's choice was an intellectual error. The answer implied by the symmetric property of equality was and is the correct one. Both
law and society are constitutive of consciousness. Both are imbricated in
law. Thick description needs to be done on both sides of law/society. So, it
would be a lie for me not to admit that I wish that Bob had put his money on
the long shot, just as I wish that Duncan had not placed the safe bet by
working to expand our crew, bringing students into our hearty band, rather
than wrestling some more with theory. My wish to extend our run on the
legal equivalent of the Billboard charts the hard way, by playing ever more
difficult music, of course, explains in part why I am here today. 4' In postWorld War II American academic life generally, anything smacking of
Marxism was, and remains, a true long shot. In law it is all but a scratch.
And yet for almost forty years, Wythe has remained true to his vision when
the odds were clearly against him. His strength of intellectual purpose and
willingness to stand alone as witness to the truth as he sees it is an object
lesson for us all who dodge and weave in the name of some supposedly
higher purpose. Academic life will be poorer for Wythe's retirement, and it
is important to be here today to say so.
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The other part needs be noted. Wythe is a gracious southern gentleman of the old school. He has
never allowed conversation in the presence of my musician wife to stray into territory that would leave
her feeling excluded. And unlike several of my northern friends, he has never had to be told that any
other behavior was unacceptable.

